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JOINT LI.BILITY-EFFECT OF TIlE DISCHARGE OF ONE OF

ACTION. Loui'ille and
Ev-ansville Mail Co. v. Barns' A.dinbistrator, 79 S. W. 261
(Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 'March I6, igo4).-The facts
of the case were as follows: Clara Barnes was a passenger on
board a steamer belonging to the 'Marsden Company. The
latter provided no gangplank by which the passengers might
disembark. At tie moment that Clara Barnes was about to
step off the steamer on to the wharf another steamer, owned
bv the Louisville and Evansville Mail Company, approached
the wharf and struck it violently, thereby causing a separation
between the steamer of the 'Marsden Company and the wharf,
through which Clara Barnes fell and was drowned. Suit was
T[IOSE JOINTLY LIABLE IN A CIVIL

brought by the administrator of Barnes against the 'Marsden

and the 'Mail Companies charging it'int and concurrent negligence Just before trial the plaintiIf dismissed without- prei,dice his action against the Marsden Company, but proceeded
with suit as regards the Mail Company. Verdict and judgment were given in favor of the plaintiff for $2ooo.
even
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days after the judgment the Marsden Company paid the plaintiff $iooo, and the latter immediately entered credit to that
amount on the judgment against the .Mail Company. The
Mail Company appealed on the ground that the appellee's
cause of action had been satisfied. The court decided that
each company had been guilty. of negligence, the one in the
manner of approach to the wharf and the other in not providing a gangplank. That the two companies were joint tort
feasors, and the appellee could have sued both jointly or
either separately for the full damages suffered. That recovery
of full satisfaction from one of two joint tort feasors bars an
action against the other for the same cause of action. That
in the present case the appellee recovered partial satisfaction
only from the 'Marsden Company and was not barred from
recovering the balance from the Mail Company. Judgment
was rendered in favor of the appellee.
Our principal case is one illustration of the effect of the
discharge of one of those jointly liable in a civil action. The
joint liability arose from joint negligence causing death. The
discharge was by accord and satisfaction by payment of a part
of the damages. The joint liability may arise either ex contractu, as on a joint or joint and several obligation, or ex
delictu, for wilful or negligent injuries to persons or property.
The various discharges fall into four classes: (I) Discharge
by operation of law. (II) Discharge by a release. (III)
Discharge by a covenant not to sue, and by an accord and
satisfaction. (IV) Discharge by a judgment, by a judgment
and execution, and by a judgment, execution, and satisfaction.
We shall classify the cases according to the character of the
discharge and consider each in turn. .Ve shall note the effect
of the different rules upon the facts in our principal case.
(I) Our first head comprises discharges by operation of
law. The rules with respect to the more important of these
discharges are well settled both in England and the United
States. If the discharge is brought about without the consent
of the party having the right of action and by no act of his, it
will not impair his rights against those jointly liable. Thus,
if one of the joint obligors or joint tort feasors dies, the survivors are not thereby discharged. Pcnoycr v. Brace, i Ld.
Raymond, 244 (Eng. 1697); Act of 8 and 9 Win. III, C. 2,
s. 7; Union Bank v. Mott, 27 N. Y. 633 (1863); Colt v.
Lcarncd, 133 'Mass. 4o9 (1883); Seamzan v. Slatr, I8 Fed.
R. 485' (1883) : Githens v. Clark, 158 Pa. 616 (893) ; Henning v. Farnsworth, 23 S. W. 663 (Va. 1895).
The same is true if one joint debtor is discharged in bankruptcy.
fe grath v. Gray, 43 L. J. C. P. 63 (1873) ; Act of
July I, 1898, s. 16 (U. S.). Since unliquidated damages for
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a tort are not provable under a commission these are not barred
by a discharge in bankruptcy and the liability of those jointly
liable is not affected. Act of July 1, I898, S. 17 (U. S.).
On the other hand, if the discharge by operation of law
occurs through the voluntary act of the plaintiff or of the
person in whose favor the joint- liability arose, and whose
legal representative is the plaintiff, then all those who are
jointly liable are likewise discharged. Thus, if the plaintiff
marries one of the joint obligors or joint tort feasors. Turner
v. Hitchcock; 20 Ia. 31o (z866).
So also if the obligee makes one of the obligors his executor
and the latter receives assets and acts in that capacity, all the
joint obligors are discharged. Fryer v. Gildridge, Hob. 14
(1641) ; Chectam v. I'ard, i B. and P. 630 (797) ; Rau'linson v. ShaW, 3 T. R. 577 (790); Frcakly v. Fox, 9 B. and C.
130 (1829) ; Low v. Peskett, I6 C. B. 5oo (1855).
(II) The second kind of discharge is by a release. The
rule in England is that the execution of a release of all claims
against one, effects the discharge of all those liable jointly
with the party released. The attitude of the English courts
has been to consider the debt or tort as giving rise to one
cause of action. Each of the wrongdoers is responsible to
the injured party for the entire damage. Hence, if the latter
releases all his claims against one of them lie is conclusively
presumed to have released his entire cause of action, although
his manifest intention was otherwise. Co. Litt. 232, a (i8o3).
With this attitude it is immaterial whether the release is under
seal or not, provided that it is supported by a sufficient consideration. This point that a seal is unnecessary is doubtful,
but such is the opinion of Lord Denman in Nicholson v. Reczill,
4 A. and E. 675 (1836), which was the first case to deliberately
consider the question. In most of the earlier cases the release
was under seal. Cocke v. Jenner, Hob. 9o (1616); Clayton
v. Kynaston, 2 Salk, 574 (1712); Everhard v. Heine, Litt.
I91 (I668). But it was not under seal in Hammono v. Rolle,
'March. 202 (1643), and Rex v. Bavlcy, I C. and P. 435 (1824).
So little emphasis was laid upon the seal that for several years
the courts held that a mere non-suit of one of those jointly
liable destroyed the cause of action against all of them. This
doctrine was introduced in Parker v. Lawrence, Hob. 96
(1617), and was overruled in l'a!sh v. Bishop, 3 Croke, 243
(j632). Story, J. (i Contracts. 53, 5 th ed.), concurs with
Lord Denman's opinion that in England a seal is unnecessary
to a release. The broad rule that a release of one discharges
all those jointly liable is now firmly established in England.
In addition to the cases just cited, see Morton's Case, Cro.
Eliz. 3o (158o) ; Blundt v. Sncdson, Cro. Jac. 116 (i6o8);
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Kiffin v. Willis, 4 Mod. 379 (i7o8); Thurman v. Wilde, ii
A. and E. 453 (x84o). However, two early cases held contra:
Penruddick's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 205 (1593), and Greely v. Lee,
Palmer, 319 (1624).
The American courts have adopted a different attitude and
have sought to assure to the injured party one complete satisfaction. Accordingly, emphasis is laid upon the seal. If the
plaintiff executes a release under seal of all claims against one
of those jointly liable, the reasoning of the English judges
applies, and all those jointly liable are discharged. Since the
instrument is under seal, he is conclusively presumed to have
received full satisfaction, and no evidence is admissible to show
that he did not receive satisfaction in full. But if the release
is merely by parol, such evidence is admissible, and if complete satisfaction has not been received, the plaintiff may proceed for tfie balance against the rest. Thus the rule rn the
United States is that a release as to all claims again one will
not discharge those jointly liable unless it is a technical release
under seal. Liability arising from a joint obligation: Ward
v. Johnson, 13 'Mass. 148 (1816) ; Rowlcv v. Stoddard, 7 John,
207 (N. Y. I81O); Bank v. Mcssenger, 9 Cow. 37 (N. Y.
1828) ; Harzcy v. SweatlCy, 23 Tenn. 449 (1844) ; Armstrong
v. Hay-ward, 6 Cal. 183 (1856) ; _.laslino v. Hiet, 37 W. Va.
536 (1892); Arnett v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 64 Mo. App. 368
(1895). The early cases in Pennsylvania are contra: Mortland v. Hines. 8 Pa. 262 (1848), and are overruled in Burke
v. Noble, 48 Pa. 168 (1864). Liability arising from a joint and
several obligation: Tuckerman v. Newhall, 17 Mass. 58r
(182-2) . Bradford v. Prescott, 85 Me.. 81 (1893).
Liability arising from a joint tort: Ellis v. Bit.7cr, 2 Ohio,
S9 (1825) ; -Iver v. .shmnead, 31 Conn. 452 (i863) (trespass); Tompkins v. Clay Street Ry. Co.. 66 Cal. 163 (0884)
(personal injury from collision) ; Spurr v. North River Ry.
Co.. 56 X. J. L. 346 (1894); Urton v. Price, 57 Cal. 270
(1881) (personal injury from explosion) ; Long v. Long, 57
Ia. 497 (8481)
(tort by election judges); Cheet-'ood v. Cal.
Nat. Bank, i13 Cal. 414 (1896) (fraud by trustees) ; Atwood
v. Brown. 72 IIl. 723 (i886) (wrongful levy).
(III) The third class of discharges includes a covenant not
to sue and an accord and satisfaction. These two discharges
are analogous and merge into each other. The English courts
have established the rule that a covenant not to sue one does
not discharge any of those jointly liable. It may not be pleaded
as a defence even by the party to whom it is given. It merely
confers upon the latter the right to a cross-action for breach
of contract. This principle seems to have had its origin in
the older rule that a covenant not to sue a sole obligor for a
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limited time merely gave the right to a cross-action. Deux v.
Jefferies, Cro. Eliz. 352 (1589) ; Alyff v. Scrimpshire, i Show.
46 (17o). However, a covenant not to sue a sole obligof
was allowed to be pleaded in bar to avoid circuity of action.
Lacy v. Kvnaston, i Lord Raymond, 69o (1715).
The different attitude of the judges of the two countries is
again apparent. The English courts do not treat the consideration received for the covenant not to sue as a partial satisfaction of the damages unless it was so intended. Dean v.
Ne-whall, 8 Term, 168 (1799) ; Hutton v. Eyric, 6 Taunt. 288
(1815).
On the other hand, the American courts, with their-emphasis
upon the securing of one and only one complete satisfaction,
credit as partial payment of the damages any moneys received
in consideration for a covenant not to sue. The plaintiff may
proceed for the balance against the r est. Tuckerniann v. Newhall. 17 "Mass. 581 (1822); Bowman v. Davis, 13 Col. 297
(Is8). Any money received in accord and satisfaction will
be thus credited. because of- this rule the plaintiff in our
principal case credited on the judgment against the Louisville
and Evansville Mail Company the amount received from the
Marsden Company.
The question frequently arises in the United States whether
full or partial satisfaction was received in return for the covenant not to sue. When there is a fixed debt or liquidated
damages the receipt of a smaller sum from a joint obligor
is clearly in but partial satisfaction. Couch V. AMills, 21 Wend.
424 (1839) : .ic..llistcr v. Sprague, 24 'Me. 297 (1844).
The same is true where the amount oT damages is ascertainable with reasonable certainty. Trespass and conversion:
Ellis v. Esson, 5o Wise. 128 (i88o) ; Smith v. Bayle, 58 Ala.
(o (1877) ; 11orsc!y v. Moss, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 341 (1893);
Snoze v. Chandler, io N. H. 92 (1839); Pogle v. Meilke,
Fraud: Parsons v. Hughes, 9 Paige,
C Wise. 248 (,84).
Miller v. Fenton, II Paige 18 (N. Y.
5oo (N. Y. 1841)
i844) ; Merchants' Bank v. Curtis, 37 Barb. 317 (1861)
Irin v. Scribncr, 15 La. An. 583 (186o).
But where the damages are not reasonably ascertainable and
the plaintiff makes an accord-and satisfaction with one of the
joint tort feasors and receives or agrees to receive a particular
sum in discharge of the releasee's liability, then the courts
will not permit the plaintiff to assert that the damage which
lie suffered exceeded the amount he received in accord and
satisfaction. It is immaterial whether he intended to reserve
the liability of the rest and recover further sums from them.
The same is true if the case has once come before a jury and
the jury have awarded any sum in satisfaction of the plaintiff's

NOTES.

cause of action. The damages are liquidated in both cases
and cannot be increased. Ellis v. Bet-cr, 2 Ohio Rep. 89
(1825); Eastnan v. Grant, 34 Vt. 387 (1835); Brown v.
Kenchcloc, 3 Cold. 292 (Tenn. 1866) ; Aycr v. Ashicad, 31
Conn. 44 (1863); Stone v. Hickinson, 89 Mass. 26 (1863) ;
Bromnlcv v. School District, 47 Vt. 381 (1875) ; Donaldson v.
Carmichacl, 102 Ga. 40 (1897) ; Hubbard v. St. Louis R. R.
Co., 72 S. W. 1073 (Mo. i9o3) ; Tompkins v. R.. R. Co., 66
Cal. 63 (1884) ; IVagncrv. R. R. Co., 41 Ill. Ap'p. 4o8 (i891);
Spurr v. R. R. Co., 56 N. J. L. 346 (84) ; Dcnczer R. R. Co.
v. Sullizvan, 22 Col. 302 (1895); Mlillcr v. Back, 168 Ia. 576
(1899); Hartigan v. Dickson, 81 Minn. 284 (I9oo); Dufur
v. Boston and Me. R. R. Co., 53 Atl. io68 (Vt. 19o3).
Under this rule, if the appellee in our principal case had
made an accord and satisfaction with the Marsden Company
at the time when he dismissed the suit without prejudice as
to them, the courts would not have allowed him to recover any
further sum from either of the companies. He shrewdly
waited until the jury liquidated the damages. The subsequent
receipt from one joint tort feasor of a sum less than the amount
of damages fixed by the jury does not discharge the joint tort
feasor from paying the balance. Irein v. Milbank, 56 N. Y.
App. 635 (1874).
Another important question arises in the construction of an
instrument in ascertaining whether it is a release of a covenant
not to sue. The English courts looked to the words to see
whether they verbally amounted to a release or a covenant
not to sue. As we have seen, the seal is not considered as a
distinguishing feature. During the first half of the nineteenth
century a difficulty arose as to the interpretation of an instrument which contained a release in general terms followed by
a reservation that it should not discharge those jointly liable.
The issue was, shall the intention of the parties govern, or
does a release effect the discharge of the rest by operation of
law? The early rule was voiced in Ez'crhardv. Hcine, Littleton
Rep. 191 (1008), in which it was held that the proviso of reservation shall be construed as void as inconsistent with the rest
of the instrument. 5 Bac. Abr. 702. iS Vin. Abr., "Release,"
G. a, 4. Contemporaneous with this reason, which treats the
release as a discharge by operation of law, existed another reason applicable only where the right of contribution existed
between the debtors, which based the rule upon a presumption
of the releasor's intention. The reasoning was that if X release A, one of two joint debtors, A and B, he is presumed to
have intended the complete discharge of A. Since the right
of contribution exists between A and.P,, if B is called upon
to pay any of the debt, B may sue A for contribution. Thus
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the release to A would not have worked his discharge. Hence
X must be presumed --o have intended to release B as well as
A in order to defeat this possible contribution. Kearseley v.
Colc, i6 M, and W. 128 (1849).
The transition to the position that a release with a proviso
amounts to a covenant not to sue was gradual, and the initial
steps were taken unconsciously. The first case which shook
the strength of the old rule was Ex Parte Gifford, 6 Ves. Jr.
8o 5 (1802). A receipt was given to one of several co-sureties
expressed to be in payment of fi9I and two notes which when
duly paid would be in full of said debt and all other demands
fronl the party released. Lord Eldon held that this instrument
did not discharge the co-sureties.
The next case was Solly v. Forbes, 2 Broad and Bing. 38
(1820). X gave a release to A, one of two partners, A. and
B, containing a proviso that it should not prejudice any claims
against B, and that it should be lawful for X to sue B or both
A and B, or whoever had the joint estate of A and B or the
separate estate of B. X brought suit against both A and B.
A pleaded the release. In the replication X set forth the
agreement and averred that the present suit was brought with
the intention of reaching the joint estate or the separate estate
of B, The court overruled the demurrer. Dallas, C. J., relied
upon an obscure case, Morris v. IWilford, 2 Show. 47 (x69I),
which he considered an authority for the proposition that a
release shall be construed according to the particular purpose
for which it was made. These were the words of the reporter's
note, but the case did not decide such a broad principle; it
merely held that a release as to all claims given to an executor
(lid not release claims against him in his individual capacity.
Dallas, C. J., relied upon it as holding that in all cases a release
shall be construed according to the maker's intention. He
ignored the old rule that the proviso was void.
It does not appear that the preceding case was brought to
the attention of Lord Deniman, who gave the deci.ion in the
next case in this series, Nicholson v. Revill, 4 A. and E. 675
(1836). The obligee struck off the name of one of two joint
and several debtors from the instrument containing the obligation, and stied his co-debtor. The court held that this discharged the latter also. Chetam v. Ward, i Broad. and Bing.
130 (18i9), was relied upon, and Ex Parte Gifford was
strongly disapproved of.
Ten years later Baron Parke in Kcarsley v. Cole, 16 M. and
W. 128 (1846). decided that the discharge of the principal
with a reset-ation of rights against the surety and executed
with the latter's consent did not discharge the obligee's right
of action against the surety. Ile based his opinion on.the con-
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sent obtained from the surety, whom he treated as a co-debtor.
If the latter subsequently was compelled to pay the debt, he
had already consented to the release of the principal debtor
and had thus waived his right to contribution. Hence, the
principal debtor alone was discharged by this instrument.
Thompson Y. Lacke, 54 Eng. Corn. Law R. 540, was decided

in the same year and reached the same conclusion even in the
absence of the consent of the joint debtor who was not released. This position was reached by a reliance upon the
authorities, not by reasoning out the position of the parties.
Wilde, J., considered Solly v. Forbes as an authority for his
position and thought that the remarks in Nicholson v. Revill
were mere dicta to the contrary.
In 1853 Lord Thurlow, in the case of Owen v. Homer, I5
jurist. 339. doubted the ability of a creditor to grant time to
his debtor and yet maintain unimpaired his right of action
against the surety. The case was sustained in the House of
Lords (ii jurist, 8M6), but on different grounds, and Chancellor Cranworth strongly dissented from the dicta of Lord
Thurlow. This case was relied upon in Price v. Barker, 4 E.
and B. 779 (1855), which held that a release to one joint and
several obligor containing a proviso of reservadon of remedies
against the remaining obligors and executed without the consent
of the latter does not effect their discharge. The rule in this
case has not been questioned since, and such is the law of
England to-day.
This same problem of distinguishing a release from a covenant not to sue has arisen in the United States and a different
principle has been adopted. The general test, as we have noted
already, is that an instrument to be a release must be under
seal: all other instruments are to be construed as covenants
not to sue. The earlier Pennsylvania cases are exceptions
and have adopted the English rule and held that a parol release
might have the same effect as a sealed release. Milliken v.
Browz, i Rawle. 391 (1829). These cases were definitely
overruled in Burke v. Noble, 48 Pa. 168 (1864).
\hen the instrument is not under seal and the amount of
damages is not reasonably ascertainable, the principles which
we have already noted are adopted (supra. page 187).

When the instrument is not under seal and the amount of
damages are reasonably ascertainable, the intention of the parties governs on the question whether one or all of those liable
are discharged. In the absence of words in the instrument expressing the intention the presumption seems generally to be in
accord with the vtrbal distinctions adopted in England. That
is. that those w, r,'s which in England would be construed as a
release would in this country be presumed in the absence of
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other evidence to have been intended as a release, and thus likewise as to a covenant not to sue. Wtalker v. McCulloch, 4 Me.
421 (1827); f'illiamson v. McGinnis, 50 Ky. 74 (185o);
Mullendore v. lVertc, 75 Ind. 431 (1881) ; Browne v. Bank, 45
N. J. L. 360 (,1883) ; City of Chicago v. Smith, 95 Ill. App.
387 (19oi); Bank v. Mcrcer, 55 Atl. R. 435 (Md. i9O3).
It seems doubtful whether evidence of.the maker's intention
will be admitted if it is not apparent from the instrument.
Evidence admitted: Burke v. Noble, 48 Pa. x68 (1864);
Winslow v. Broz,n, 7 R. I. 95 (x86i). Evidence excluded:
tteckman v..Uaun,, 4 Col. 543 (1878) ; Goss v. Ellson, 136
"Mass. 503 (1884). \Vhen the intention is apparent on the face
of the instrument it.is well settled that this intention shall govcrn. Parmerlecv. La-Wrence, 44 Ill. 405 (18o7) ; Bloss v. Plymale, 3 W. Va. 393 (1809) ; Bradfoid v. Prescott,85 Me. 482
(1893); Merchants' v. Nat. Bank, 31 S. W. Ioi (Tex.
1895) ; .Elgin City Bank v. Self, 35 S. W. 953 (Tex. 1896).
When the instrument is under seal it is construed as a release unless it contains an express proviso that those jointly
liable shall not be discharged. The courts are not uniform in
their interpretation of the sealed instrument with a proviso.
A few -have adopted the rule of E-verhard v. Heine (supra,
page 188) and held that the proviso is void as inconsistent.
Collier v. Field, I Mont. 612 (1872); Gunther v. Lee, 45
31d. 6o (1876). The general rule seems to be that the proviso
will be honored if the damages are ascertainable. North. Ins.
Co. v. Potter, 63 Cal. 157 (1883) ; Pettigrew Machinc Co. v.
Harmon. 45 Ark. 290 (1885) ; Bradford v. Prescott, 85 Me.
482 (1893); Ir.in v. Scribner, 15 La. An. 583 (i86o).
But when the damages are not ascertainable the proviso will
be treated as void on the grounds that the plaintiff has received
one complete satisfaction. Brownson Y. FitJ:hte, i Hill, 188
N. Y. 1841); Mitchell v. Allen, 25 Hum. 543 (N. Y. 1881)
O'Shea v. C. and St. L. R. R. Co.. 44 C. C. A. 6o (U. S.
1899),; Abb v. N. Pac. R. R. Co., 28 Wash. 428 (19o2) ; Dunlaner, v. ButTon, 173 'Mo. 1 (1902); McBridge v. Scott, 93
N. _,V. 243 (Mich. 1903) ; Leeds v. X. IY. Tel. Co., 79 N. Y.
Ap. 121 ('1903).

(IN') The fourth and remaining class of discharges consists of a judgment, a judgment and execution, and a judgment. execution, and satisfaction. The nature of the joint
liability largely determines the rules with respect to this class of
discharges. Where two or more are jointly and not severally
bound. and the plaintiff fails to join all of the joint obligors
who are \xithin the Jurisdiction of the court, a plea in abatement lies, and if the defendants fail to file the plea in abatement before the case comes to judgment, those not joined are
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completely discharged from liability. It is immaterial whether
execution or satisfaction follow. 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 42, s. 8;
Freeman on Judgments, 231; Mmm v. 11aynes, 46 Mich. 14o

(i8Si);

Groat v. Agens,

1o7

N. Y. 633 (1887); contra:

Sheey v. Mandertille, 6 Cranch, 253 (i81o), which was over-

ruled in Mason v. Eldred, 6 Wall. 231 (1867).
The old rule in England was that the court would not allow
the plaintiff on obtaining a joint judgment to sue'out execution
against less than the entire number of the judgment debtors.
i Rolle Abr., " Execution." N. From this we could gather
that if the plaintiff actually did sue out execution against some
only of the defendants he would thereby discharge those
omitted. But this principle does not seem to hold in the United
States. Michdw v. Bonner, 24 La. An. 287 (1872); Nichols
v. Dutbar, 58 Cal. 605 (881) ; Crissct v. Wiles, 13 Civ. Pro.
Rep. 527 (N. Y. i888).
If the liability arise from a joint and several contract, the
obligee may treat the contract as a joint one, in which case the
liability will be exactly like that arising from joint and not
several contract, or he may treat it as a several contract. In
the latter case no question of joint liability arises. But he may
not sue more than one and less than the entire number of
obligors. Winslow v. Herrick, 9 Mich. 380 (i86x).
If the plaintiff proceeds and obtains a judgment against
several debtors jointly and one of them pays his share or makes
an accord and satisfaction, the court will interpret the receipt
as regards the discharge of the other judgment debtors either
as a release or a covenant not to sue by the same principles
which are applicable in the case of an ordinary debt. Kolb
v. Nat. Suretv Co., I76 N. Y. 133 (1903). Altered in Pennsylvania.by Act of 1862, March 22. P. L. 167.
When the liability arises from a joint tort the person injured
may sue any one or several or all of the joint tort feasors.
Each is responsible for the entire damage and no plea in abatement lies for non-joinder. Nccdant's Case. 5 Co. J2 (1612).
However, the question still arises whether or not judgment,
execution, or satisfaction against one tort feasor bars subsequent actions against the rest. The modern English rule is
that a mere judgment bars, most of the American jurisdictions
hold that nothing short of satisfaction discharges the joint
tort feasors, while a few courts adopt the intermediate position
that an execution will accomplish this result. It is to be noted
that the rules prevailing in England and the United States are
in harmony with the different attitudes (supra, page 185) of
the judges of the two countries.
It is very difficult to determine from the early cases in Eng-
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land what was the exact position held by the court. The language in nearly all is that judgment and execution are a bar,
but there is nothing which would lead us to believe that "execution" was not used synonymously with "satisfaction."
Honey v. Rice, 2 Rolle, 224 (1217); Anonymous Jenkins i
Cent. case 89 (893) ; Lindell v. Pinfold, I Leon. i9 (1584) ;
Hitchcock's Case, 3 Leon. 122 (0585) ; Hitcharn v. Murcharn,
Noy, 4 (1656) ; Hqcvdon's Case, ii Co. 8 (1614).
Cocke v. Jenner, Hob. 6o (1703), laid down the rule that
where there are several actions against several defendants the
plaintiff may take his choice of the best damages, yet when he
has taken satisfaction he can take no more. This case is the
precedent for those courts which hold that execution, although
unsatisfied, precludes further recovery.
The case which unsettled the law in England and led the
way to the modern English rule is Brownz v. Wooton, Cro.
Jac. 73, also in Moore, 762, and Yelv. 67 (16o6). It was an
action on the case for trover and conversion of some-plate.
The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had brought an action
of trover against J. S. and had recovered judgment and execution. On demurrer, the plea was adjudged good. Popham,
C. J., said: " If one had judgment in trespass against one
and recovered damages certain, although he be not satisfied,
yet he shall not have a new action for this trespass. By the
same reason, c contra, if one hath cause of action against two
and obtain judgment against one, he shall not have a remedy
against the other; and the difference between this case and
the case of debt and obligation against two is because there
every one of them is charged and liable for the entire debt,
andltherefore a recovery against one is no bar against the other
until satisfaction." Fenner, J., added: " In case of trespass
after judgment given the property of the goods is changed
so that he may not seize them again." The further reason is
added that the demand rested in damages and the judgment
reduced them to certainty, and therefore another suit could
not be maintained for that which was uncertain.
This case was not immediately followed. Higgen's Case,
6 Co. (I793); Drake v. Mitchel, 3 East, 258 (18o3). The
court in Cla.rton v. Swift. 2 Shower, 494, also in 3 Mod. 86,
and in I Lutw. 882 (i68S). likewise adopted the old rule and
said that it was never pretcnded till Brown v. WVooton that a
mere judgment would act as a bar.
In 1844 Bro-wn v. Wooton was affirmed by King v. Hoare,
13 'M. and W. 494 (1844). The court upheld three propositions: (i) A judgment without satisfaction against one of
two joint debtors is a bar to a suit against the other. (2) A
judgment in a court of record changes the nature of the cause
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of .action and prevents it being the subject of another suit,
and the cause of action being single cannot afterwards be
divided into two. (3) As regards a discharge, a joint contract cannot be distinguished from a joint tort. In spite of
the strong language'used this case did not fix the law. A-case
in 1865 was decided according to the old rule, Priestly v.
Fernic, 13 Weekly Rep. io89. But the law of England on
this point as it stands to-day was determined by Brinsmead
v. Harrison, L. J. 6 C. P. 584. in 1871, which held that a mere
judgment against one tort feasor barred an action against
another. See In Re Morgcngrv, 69 L. J. Probate N. S. 3, also
in 81 L. T. N. S. 417, and 48 Week. R. 1i (1899).
The rule of England that a judgment bars has been adopted
in only one of the American states, the one in which the question first arose-Virginia. Two early cases adopted the rule,
Amnonett v. Harris, I Hen. and.M. 488 (I807), and Wilkes
In i895 the Supreme
v. Jackson, 2"Hen and MN.355 (8o8).
Court of the state reaffirmed these earlier cases. Petticolas v.
Richmond, 95 Va. 456.
Pennsylvania and Tennessee in the early cases adopted the
English rule, but subsequent decisions .in each state have
firmly established the principle that nothing less than a satisfaction bars. Floyd v. Brown, I Rawle, 121 (1829), and
Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle, 285 (1833), overruled in Fox v.
Northern Liberties, 3 W. and S. io3 (i84i). Rochester v.
Anderson, i Bibb. 439 (18o4), overruled in Knott v. Cunningham, 2 Sneed, 2o4 (1854).
Rhode Island in Hunt v. Bates, 7 R. I. 217 (1802), adopted
the same position, but has since returned to the intermediate
principle that execution bars. Parmenterv. Barstow, 21 R. I.
480( 899).
The rule that execution bars was also adopted in Maine,
"Michigan, Indiana, and Arkansas. .Michigan, Indiana, and
Arkansas have not altered their position. Davis v. Scott, i
Blackf. 169 (Ind. 1832); Ashcraft v. Knoblock, x46 Ind. 174
(1896); McGee v. OZ'erly, 12 Ark. 164 (185i); Boardman
v. Accr, 13 Mich. 77 (1866) ; Kenyon v. Woodruff, 33 Mich.
The early Maine case has been definitely
310 (1876).
overruled. White v. Phibrick, 5 Me. 147 (1828); Cleveland
v. Bangor, 87 'Me. 259 (1898).
The most important cases holding that a satis-faction bars
are as follows: Lovejoy v. Murray. 3 Wall. i (U. S. S. C.
1865); Smith v. Gavle. 58 Ala. &)6o (1877); Vandever v.
Iollak, io7 Ala. 551 (1899) ; Cheet-wood v. Cal. Nat. Bank,
113 Cal. 414 (1896) ; Sheldon v. Kibbe. 3 Conn. 214 (819);
Vincent v. McXaniara. 70 Conn. 332 (897) ; Norfolk Lumber Co. v. Simmons, 2 _Marv. 317 (1895) ; Vorrick v. People,
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187 Ill. 110 (19oo) ; Miller v. Peck, io8 Ia. 575 (x898);
lfestbrook v. Mize, 33 Kas. 299 (1881) ; Elliott v. Porter,
5 Dana. 299 (1837) ; Bcrklqv v. Vilson, 87 ,Nd. 219 (1898)
(the satisfaction received was one cent) ; Loring v. Salisbury
Mills, 125 Mass. 153 (1878) ; Haydon v. Wf'oods, 16 Neb. 3o6
(1884); FozLler v. Owen, 68 N. H. 207 (1895); Allen v.
Craig, 14 N. J. L. 104 (1834): Russell v. McCall, 14I N. Y.
Ap. 437 (1894) (libel); Martin v. Buffaloe, 128 N. C. 3o8
(1901);

Maple v. R. R. Co., 4o Oh. St. R. 313 (1884);

Dcroca v. Hamilton, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 317 (1894) ; Ha-zkins v.
Hatton, i Nott and McCord, 318 (818) ; Huffman v. Ha.-lett,
ii Lea. 549 (Tenn. 1883) ; Sadcrson v. CaldiCll, 2 Aik, 195
(Vt. 1827) ; Griffe v. McClung, 5 W. Va. 131 (1872).
A.S.F.

